In a broad sense, logic is the eld of formal languages for knowledge and truth that have a formal semantics. It tends to be dicult to give a narrower denition because very dierent kinds of logics exist. One of the most fundamental contrasts is between the dierent methods of assigning semantics. Here two classes can be distinguished: model theoretical semantics based on a foundation of mathematics such as set theory, and proof theoretical semantics based on an inference system possibly formulated within a type theory.
Abstract
In a broad sense, logic is the eld of formal languages for knowledge and truth that have a formal semantics. It tends to be dicult to give a narrower denition because very dierent kinds of logics exist. One of the most fundamental contrasts is between the dierent methods of assigning semantics. Here two classes can be distinguished: model theoretical semantics based on a foundation of mathematics such as set theory, and proof theoretical semantics based on an inference system possibly formulated within a type theory.
Logical frameworks have been developed to cope with the variety of available logics unifying the underlying ontological notions and providing a meta-theory to reason abstractly about logics. While these have been very successful, they have so far focused on either model or proof theoretical semantics. We contribute to a unied framework by showing how a type/proof theoretical Edinburgh Logical Framework LF can be applied to the representation of model theoretical logics.
We give a comprehensive formal representation of rst-order logic covering both its proof and its model theoretical semantics and its soundness in LF. For the model theory, we have to represent the mathematical foundation itself in LF, and we provide two solutions for that. Firstly, we give a meta-language that is strong enough to represent the model theory while being simple enough to be treated as a fragment of untyped set theory. Secondly, we represent Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and show how it subsumes our meta-language. All representations are given in and mechanically veried by the Twelf implementation of LF. Moreover, we use the Twelf module system to treat all connectives and quantiers independently. Thus, individual connectives are available for reuse when representing other logics, and we obtain the rst version of a feature library from which logics can be pieced together.
Our results and methods are not restricted to rst-order logic and scale to a wide variety of logical systems thus demonstrating the feasibility of comprehensively formalizing large scale representation theorems in a logical framework. While some model-theoretical frameworks attempt to integrate proof theory (e.g., [Mes89, MGDT05, Dia06] ), the opposite integration is less developed. This is unfortunate because many of the results and techniques developed for proof theoretical logics could also benet model-theoretical reasoning.
We are particularly interested in logic encodings in the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF), which is related to Martin-Löf type theory and can be seen as the dependently-typed corner of the λ-cube ([Bar92] ). LF represents syntax and proof theoretical semantics of a logic using higher order abstract syntax and the judgments-as-types paradigm ( [ML96] ). This has proved very successful for proof-theoretical logic representations ([HST94, AHMP98, Pfe00, NSM01]).
In [Rab08] , we introduced a framework that attempts to preserve and exploit the respective advantages of model and proof theoretical representation. The central idea is to also represent the model theory of a logic in a type-theoretical logical framework by specifying models in a suitable meta-language.
In this paper we show how to implement such logic representations in LF. We pick LF because we have recently equipped the Twelf implementation of LF with a strong module system [PS99, RS09] . This module system is rigorously based on theory morphisms, which have proved very successful to reason about modeltheoretical logic representations (e.g., [GB92, AHMS99, SW83] ). Therefore, it is particularly appropriate for an encoding that combines proof-and modeltheoretical aspects.
Our central results are (i) the full representation of rst-order logic (FOL)
comprising syntax, proof theory, and model theory, and (ii) a formal proof of the soundness of FOL based on this representation. In particular, the soundness proof is veried mechanically by the LF implementation Twelf. While this is interesting in itself, the main value of our work is not the encoding but the methodology we employ. We use FOL as an example logic mainly because it is most widely known and thus interferes least with the rather abstract subject matter. Other logics can be represented analogously.
Furthermore, we use the LF module system for a modular development of syntax, proof theory, model theory, and soundness, i.e., all connectives and quantiers are treated separately in all four parts of the encoding. These modules can be reused exibly to encode other logics. For example, we obtain encodings for any logic that arises by omitting some connectives or quantiers from FOL.
Less trivially, the encoding of each connective or quantier can be reused for any logic using them. For example, this enabled one of our students to extend the work presented here to sorted FOL within two days.
Our approach is especially interesting when studying rarer or new logics, for which no smoothed-out semi-formal denitions are available yet. In particular, our framework can be used for the rapid prototyping of logics. Since it covers both proof and model theory, it permits an approach that we call syntaxsemantics-codesign, to coin a phrase: Researchers can give a fully formal and mechanically veried denition of a formal language and its semantics at a level of convenience and elegance that competes with working it out on paper.
In Sect. 2, we describe some preliminaries and introduce some notation: FOL in Sect. 2.1, and LF in Sect. 2.2. In Sect. 3, we sketch the framework we will use. The main sections of this paper are Sect. 4 and 5. In the former, we give the encoding of FOL in LF where we use a variant of higher-order logic as a simple and convenient meta-language to represent the models. In the latter, we extend the encoding to cover set theory itself as a foundation of mathematics, in which models are expressed. Thus, we can give a comprehensive representation of FOL and its set-theoretical model theory in LF. Both in Sect. 4 and 5, we describe the encoding of FOL in a way that makes the general methodology apparent and provides a template for the encoding of other logics.
A preliminary version of this paper has appeared as [HR09] . The present version has been fully revised and substantially extended. Most importantly, the encoding of set theory, which was only sketched in [HR09] , has been worked out.
Among the changes we made, two are especially notable. Firstly, we changed the meta-language employed to represent models from Martin-Löf type theory to higher-order logic. This was motivated by the desire to separate types and propositions rather than identify them. Secondly, in [HR09] , we identied some features missing in the implementation of the LF module system. These have been added by now, which enabled us to completely refactor the LF encodings.
Our approach is very extensible, and we have treated or are currently working on corresponding representations of sorted, higher-order, and description logics.
These are part of a logic atlas that is developed as a collaborative research eort within the LATIN project ( [KMR09] ). All Twelf sources are available from the project website.
Preliminaries

First-Order Logic
In this section, we will introduce rst-order logic in order to give an overview of the denitions and notations we will use. The denitions here also serve as the reference denitions when proving the adequacy of our encodings.
Denition 1 (Signatures). A FOL-signature is a triple (Σ f , Σ p , ar) where Σ f and Σ p are disjoint sets of function and predicate symbols, respectively, and ar : Σ f ∪ Σ p → N assigns arities to symbols. We will treat constants and boolean variables as the special case of arity 0.
Denition 2 (Expressions).
A FOL-context is a list of variables. For a signature Σ and a context Γ, the terms over Σ and Γ are formed from the variables in Γ and the application of function symbols f ∈ Σ f to terms according to ar(f ). The formulas over Σ and Γ are formed from the application of predicate symbols p ∈ Σ p to a number of terms according to ar(p) as well as . =, true, false, ¬, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∀, and ∃ in the usual way. Formulas in the empty context are called Σ-sentences, and we write Sen(Σ) for the set of sentences.
Denition 3 (Theories). A FOL-theory is a pair (Σ, Θ) for a signature Σ and a set Θ ⊆ Sen(Σ) of axioms.
Denition 4 (Signature Morphisms). Given two signatures Σ = (Σ f , Σ p , ar) and Σ = (Σ f , Σ p , ar ), a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ is an aritypreserving mapping from Σ f to Σ f and from Σ p to Σ p . The homomorphic extension of σ which we also denote by σ is the mapping from terms and formulas over Σ to terms and formulas over Σ that replaces every symbol s ∈ Σ f ∪ Σ p with σ(s). The sentence translation Sen(σ) :
Sen(Σ) → Sen(Σ ) arises as the special case of applying σ to sentences.
Example 5 (Monoids and Groups). We will use the theories Monoid = (MonSig, MonAx ) and Group = (GrpSig, GrpAx ) of monoids and groups as running examples. MonSig f is the set {•, e} where • is binary (written inx) and e is nullary, and MonSig p is empty. MonAx consists of the axioms for
• left-neutrality: ∀x e • x . = x,
The theory Group extends Monoid , i.e., GrpSig adds a unary function symbol inv (written as superscript −1 ) to MonSig, and GrpAx adds axioms for
to MonAx . The inclusion mapping MonGrp is a signature morphism from MonSig to GrpSig. It is also a theory morphism from Monoid to Group.
There are various ways to dene the proof theory of FOL. In this paper we choose the natural deduction calculus (ND) with introduction and elimination rules. We will use the phrase proof theoretical semantics when speaking about the induced provability relation; we will not consider proof normalization, which some authors mean when using that phrase.
Denition 6 (Proof Theoretical Theorems). Given a theory (Σ, Θ), we say that F ∈ Sen(Σ) is a theorem of (Σ, Θ) if the judgment F 1 , . . . , F n Σ F is derivable for some {F 1 , . . . , F n } ⊆ Θ using the calculus shown in Fig. 1 . We write this as Θ Σ F .
Denition 7 (Proof Theoretical Theory Morphisms). A signature morphism from Σ to Σ is a proof theoretical theory morphism from (Σ, Θ) to (Σ , Θ ),
maps the axioms of (Σ, Θ) to theorems of (Σ , Θ ), i.e., for all F ∈ Θ, Θ Σ Sen(σ)(F ) holds.
Lemma 8 (Proof Translation). Assume a theory morphism σ : (Σ, Θ) → (Σ , Θ ). If F is a theorem of (Σ, Θ), then Sen(σ)(F ) is a theorem of (Σ , Θ ). In other words, provability is preserved along theory morphisms.
We develop the model theory of FOL as an institution ( [GB92] ).
Figure 1: Proof Rules Denition 9 (Models of a FOL-Signature). A FOL-model of a signature Σ is a pair (U, I) where U is a non-empty set (called the universe) and I is an interpretation function of Σ-symbols such that
We write Mod (Σ) for the class of Σ-models.
Denition 10 (Model Theoretical Semantics). Assume a signature Σ, a context Γ, and a Σ-model M = (U, I). An assignment is a mapping from Γ to U . For an assignment α, the interpretations t M,α ∈ U of terms t and F M,α ∈ {0, 1} of formulas F over Σ and Γ are dened in the usual way by induction on the syntax. Given a sentence F , we write M |= Σ F if F M = 1.
Given a theory (Σ, Θ), we write the class of (Σ, Θ)-models as Denition 13 (Model Theoretical Theory Morphisms). Given two theories (Σ, Θ) and (Σ , Θ ), a model theoretical theory morphism from (Σ, Θ) to (Σ , Θ ),
, is a signature morphism from Σ to Σ such that Mod (σ) reduces models of (Σ , Θ ) to models of (Σ, Θ), i.e, for all M ∈ Mod (Σ , Θ ), we have Mod (σ)(M ) ∈ Mod (Σ, Θ).
Lemma 14 (Satisfaction Condition). Assume a FOL-signature morphism σ :
Example 15 (Continued). The integers form a model Int = (Z, +, 0, −) for the theory of groups (where we use a tuple notation to give the universe and the interpretations of •, e, and inv , respectively).
The model reduction
Mod (MonGrp)(Int) = (Z, +, 0) along MonGrp yields the integers seen as a model of the theory of monoids.
We have given both proof theoretical and model theoretical denitions of theorem and theory morphism. In general, these must be distinguished to avoid a bias towards proof or model theory. However, they coindice if a logic is sound and complete:
Theorem 16 (Soundness and Completeness). Assume a FOL-theory (Σ, Θ) and a Σ-sentence F . Then Θ Σ F i Θ |= Σ F . Therefore, for a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ , we have σ : (Σ, Θ) Typed constants are declared to represent the expressions of the represented system. For STT, we add
LF and
Here =⇒ is a low-binding right-associative inx symbol that takes two tparguments and returns a tp. It represents STT-function type formation. In the following, we will always omit the xity and associativity declarations if they are clear from the context. In particular, besides =⇒ and @, binary symbols such as connectives and equality are always assumed to be declared as inx. prop : type
Here the type T rue F represents the judgment that F is true. A judgment J is proved if there is a term of type J. Consequently, all axioms and inference rules such as the implication elimination rule ⇒ E are represented as constants, and proofs of F are represented as terms of type T rue F .
Finally, an LF signature is a list of kinded type family declarations a : K and typed constant declarations c : A. Both may carry denitions, i.e., c : A = t introduces c as an abbreviation for t. This yields the following grammar for the fragment of LF we will use: 
Here we have already included LF signature morphisms. Given two signatures Σ and Σ , a signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ is a typing-preserving map of Σ-symbols to Σ -expressions. Thus, σ maps every constant c : A of Σ to a term σ(c) : σ(A) and every type family symbol a : K to a type family σ(a) : σ(K).
Here, σ is the homomorphic extension of σ to Σ-expressions, and we will write σ instead of σ from now on. Signature morphisms preserve typing, i.e., if Σ E : F , then Σ σ(E) : σ(F ). In particular, because σ must map all axioms or inference rules declared in Σ to proofs or derived inference rules, respectively, over Σ , signature morphisms preserve the provability of judgments.
We will write σ σ for the diagram-order composition of signature morphisms, i.e., (σ σ )(E) = σ (σ(E)).
The module system for LF and Twelf ( [RS09] ) is based on the notion of signature morphisms ( [HST94] ). The toplevel declarations of modular LF declare named signatures and named signature morphisms, called views, e.g.,
Since signature morphisms must map axioms to proofs, a view has the avor of a theorem establishing a translation from S to T or a representation of S in T or a renement of S into T .
Besides views, the module system provides inclusion morphisms that hold by denition: %include S declared in T copies all declarations of S into T (thus changing T ). This represents an inheritance or import relationship from S to T . The inclusion relation is transitive, and multiple inclusions of the same signature are identied. Twelf uses qualied names to access included symbols, but we will simply assume that included symbols c of S are accessible as c within
Views can be given modularly, too. If S includes R, then a view v S from S to T must map all constants of S, i.e., also those of R. Often a view v R from R to T is already present. In that case v S can include v R via %include v R and only give maps for the symbols of S. If v S is dened like that, the triangle on the right always commutes.
Thus, we arrive at the following grammar for the fragment of modular LF we will use. Here we use E for a kind, type family, or term as dened above:
Sign. body
A Logical Framework Combining Proof and Model Theory
LF was designed as a language for the representation of formal systems.
Similarly, the LF module system was designed as a language for the representation of translations between formal systems. This makes it a very appropriate framework for the comprehensive representation of a logic where translations between dierent signatures of a logic as well as between syntax and semantics are prevalent.
In the following, we will give an overview of the logical framework we gave in [Rab08, Rab10] . We will not actually give the framework itself, which requires a further level of abstraction beyond the scope of this paper. Then Σ-sentences F are represented as β-η-normal LF-terms of type o over the signature Σ syn . We will write F for the LF-term representing the sentence F . An encoding is adequate for the syntax if this representation is a bijection.
Similarly, Σ-proofs of F using assumptions F 1 , . . . , F n are represented as
Again we write P for the encoding of the proof P and say that the encoding is adequate if it is a bijection.
We will elaborate on the representation of Σ-models and the truth in models throughout the text.
It is noteworthy how the framework takes a balanced position between proof and model theoretical perspectives on logic. In particular, the type ded F is used to represent truth both proof-and model-theoretically. Proof-theoretically, terms of type ded F represent proofs of F , model-theoretically ded F is a predicate on the truth value of F .
A particular feature of the framework is that soundness can be represented In this work, we give a concrete semantic domain, which permits to represent models in the framework as well.
Representing First-Order Logic
As described in Sect. mod will include a meta-language in which the models are specied. In textbook style descriptions, this meta-language is usually natural language implicitly based on some set-theoretical foundation of mathematics. We have to formalize this meta-language and thus pick an intuitionistic logic on top of simple type theory, which we refer to as HOL. We dene it in Sect. 4.3. Then we discuss the adequacy of our encoding in Sect. 4.5. Finally, we prove the soundness of FOL by giving a view from F OL pf to F OL mod in Sect. 4.6.
When encoding signatures and theories in LF, we have the problem that definitions of FOL signatures usually permit arbitrary objects as symbol names.
But LF and Twelf expressions have to be words over a countable alphabet.
Therefore, we employ two restrictions that are somewhat severe theoretically but natural for applications in computer science. From now on, all FOL theories have a nite number of function and predicate symbols and axioms. It is straightforward to dene encodings for innite theories, but type-theoretical frameworks usually avoid reasoning about innite signatures. Furthermore, all function and predicate symbols are chosen from a xed countable set, and without loss of generality, we assume this set to be the set of legal Twelf identiers.
Thus, we can use the same names in FOL signatures and their encodings.
4.1. Syntax The LF signatures are given in Fig. 3 We can now encode FOL-signatures as LF-signatures that extend F OL syn .
The distinction between signatures and theories is not important from the perspective of LF as the encoding of axioms is very similar to the encoding of function and predicate symbols. Furthermore, we can always consider signatures as the special case of theories without axioms. Therefore, we will unify them and use Σ for both signatures and theories.
Denition 17 (Encoding Syntax). Let Σ be a FOL-signature or theory. We dene the LF-encoding Σ syn of Σ as the LF-signature that includes F OL syn and adds the following symbol declarations:
• a : ded F for axioms F of Σ and some fresh name a.
Here F is the encoding of F ∈ Sen(Σ). Every Σ-term t or formula F in context x 1 , . . . , x n is encoded as an LF term t : i or F : o, respectively, in context x 1 : i, . . . , x n : i. t and F are dened by an obvious induction, and we only give the case of quantiers as an example:
Denition 18 pf in the encodings of other logics do contain additional declarations, e.g., when using sequent or tableaux calculi.
pf , etc. encode the introduction and elimination rules for the individual connectives. We refer to [HHP93] for details about the encoding of proof rules and only give disjunction as an example. Approximating Foundations. In this paper, we choose ZFC set theory as the foundation because it is the standard foundation of mathematics. Therefore, we encode ZFC in LF and use it as the meta-language to dene models. However, ZFC behaves badly computationally because it is engineered towards elegance and simplicity rather than decidability or eciency. Therefore, we also use a second meta-language a variant of higher-order logic (HOL) which can be worked with eciently.
The intuition is that ZFC gives the ocial denition, and HOL is a sound but Moreover, we can construct a chain of foundations of increasing strength, e.g., HOL → ZF → ZFC, and always work in the weakest possible foundation. This is in keeping with mathematical practice not to commit to a specic foundation unless necessary, and leads to an approach we call little foundations (inspired by [FGT92] ). For example, our encodings in [KMR09] , avoid the use of excluded middle and the axiom of choice whenever possible.
In this section, we will only consider HOL, which we introduce below and use as the meta-language to represent models in Sect. 4.4. In Sect. 5, we encode ZFC set theory in LF, rene our HOL-based semantics into a ZFC-based one, and revisit the encoding of model theory.
HOL as a Meta-Language. For the representation of rst-order logic, we need the booleans bool , an arbitrary set univ (the universe), and functions between the universe and the booleans. Among the latter are functions from univ n to univ , from univ n to bool , and from bool and bool 2 to bool interpreting the function symbols, predicate symbols, and the propositional connectives, respectively.
Furthermore, the quantiers must be interpreted as second-order functions from bool univ to bool . Finally, these functions should be typed, and that leads us to the choice of HOL as the meta-language. To dene HOL, we encode it as the LF signature given in Fig. 5 . Actually, we only give a partial signature here and omit all the proof rules. The full version of the encoding of HOL can be found at [KMR09] . Note that this signature extends the running example of Sect. 2.2 except that we write set and elem instead of tp and tm to emphasize the relation to set theory. set is the type of sets, and =⇒ gives the set of functions between two sets. elem A is the type of elements of set A this lets us reason about the elements of a set without using the ∈ relation. HOL must be a sound but not necessarily a complete fragment of set theory: Thus, the relation a : elem A must imply a ∈ A, but the inverse does not have to hold. Then λ and @ encode function formation and application. This yields the standard encoding of simple type theory in LF.
Finally, prop is the type of propositions. The propositional connectives are declared in the usual way. Equality and the quantiers take an implicit argument A for the set which they operate on. Note that this means that we use equality only between elements of the same set and only use bound quantiers. We omit the proof rules for HOL here and only state that we use rules for β and η conversion, and natural deduction introduction and elimination rules for the connectives and quantiers. Equality is axiomatized as a congruence relation on each type. We do not assume the axiom of excluded middle this turns out to suce to axiomatize FOL models and makes us more exible because we are not a priori committed to classical foundations of mathematics.
It is interesting to note that the actual encoding in Twelf is a little dierent because it already benets from the LF module system: Our logic library represents the syntax and proof theory of the propositional connectives once and for all, and they are imported both into the object logic FOL and into the meta-language HOL.
The use of HOL as the meta-language means that the model theory of the object language (e.g., FOL) is represented as an extension of the signature HOL, i.e., a HOL-theory. Therefore, we dene:
Denition 22 (HOL-theories). A theory of HOL is an LF signature that includes the signature HOL and that only adds declarations of the following forms:
• base sets: S : set,
• constant symbols: c : elem S for some set S,
• axioms: a : T rue F for some proposition F .
While the model theory of the object language is represented as a HOLtheory, every individual model is represented as a HOL model. Therefore, we have to dene HOL models as well. In Sect. 5, we will show how models can be encoded as syntactical entities of LF, but here we will do something simpler and dene (standard) HOL models as platonic objects in an underlying set theoretical universe:
Denition 23 (HOL-Models). Assume a xed set-theoretical universe. A model M of an HOL-theory T is a mapping that assigns:
• to every base set S : set a set S M , λ and @ with function formation and function application. Both F OL mod and µ follow the same modular structure as in F OL syn and
Model Theory
F OL
pf , however, for the sake of simplicity, we will present the at version of our encoding in this paper.
Specication of FOL Models. In F OL mod we rst encode the model theoretical notion of truth and the universe of a model. We declare a set bool which represents the set {0, 1} of truth values and axiomatize this by declaring 0 and 1, and axioms ax cons and ax boole to state that bool is indeed the desired 2-element set:
Recall that T rue : prop → type is the truth judgment of the meta-language HOL, that ¬ and ∨ are the negation and disjunction on HOL propositions, and . = is the typed-equality of HOL terms. In particular, these symbols are dierent from the symbols of the same name in the syntax of FOL.
We declare the symbol univ as a set for the universe of a FOL-model, and add an axiom making univ non-empty.
univ
: As examples we present the cases for ∨ and ∀. For the interpretation of ∨, we declare the symbol or as a HOL-function from bool 2 to bool and axiomatize it to be the binary supremum in the boolean 2-element lattice.
Similarly, for the interpretation of ∀, we specify the function forall that takes a univ -indexed family F of booleans and returns its inmum, i.e., it returns 1 i all F @x is 1 for all x.
forall
An overview of the operations and axioms declared for the remaining connectives and quantiers is given in Fig. 6 . In all cases except for equality, we have two axioms of the form C 0 ⇒ F . = 0 and C 1 ⇒ F . = 1, e.g., and0 for when a conjunction is false and and1 for when it is true. For equality, our results below require a slightly stronger condition, namely the axiom eq1 of the form C 1 ⇔ F . = 1 (from which the corresponding ¬C 1 ⇔ F . = 0 can be derived).
Interpretation Function. The idea of the view µ is that it maps from the syntax to the semantics; it gives the cases of the interpretation function for the logical symbols. This takes the form of a view from F OL syn to F OL mod , which must
give a F OL mod -expression for all symbols declared in or included into F OL syn .
Formulas are interpreted as boolean truth values, and we map the type o of formulas to the type elem bool of truth values. The truth value 1 is designated, i.e., represents truth. Therefore, we map ded to a type family that takes an argument F of type elem bool and returns the judgment that F is equal to 1.
FOL-terms are interpreted as elements of the universe. Therefore, we map the type i of FOL-terms to the type elem univ of elements of univ . 
true
It is easy to check that this is indeed a HOL-model of Σ mod , i.e., satises all the axioms of Σ mod .
We could also encode model translations, but we can do this more elegantly in Sect. 5. pf is mapped to p for some proof p of Sen(σ)(F ). 
Example 29 (Continued
Recall that for FOL, we have µ Σ (ded
Proof. 
Then the logic FOL is sound i (i) implies (ii), and complete i (ii) implies (i).
Proof. Immediately using the adequacy of proof and model theory.
Among all the meta-logical properties that can be studied after encoding a logic in LF, soundness is particularly interesting because we have the following result:
Theorem 37. If there is a signature morphism σ from F OL pf to F OL mod such that π σ = µ, then the logic FOL is sound. Proof. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that for every FOL-signature Σ there is a signature morphism σ Σ from Σ pf to Σ mod such that the following diagram commutes:
σ Σ is simply the universal morphism factoring σ and µ Σ through the pushout Σ pf .
Secondly, we show soundness using Thm. 36. So assume (i). Since signature morphisms are type-preserving mappings, there must be a term of type
implication introduction rule of HOL shows that (ii) holds.
These results may be criticized as being implications between statements known to be true. But recall that the same methodology can be applied to a very wide variety of other logics, and we obtain the corresponding result for every such logic.
In general, Thm. 37 is only a sucient criterion. It cannot be necessary for all logic encodings because HOL is only a (sound but incomplete) fragment of set theory, which may or may not be strong enough to carry out the soundness proof for the encoded logic. However, in our experience such a morphism typically exists for reasonable choices of the meta-language. 
Its map is given by
Here ⇒ E is the modus ponens rule, and ∨ Il is the left introduction rule of disjunction of the meta-language. ⇒ E and ∨ Il are among the proof rules declared in HOL, which we omitted in Sect. 4.3.
Representing Set-Theoretical Model Theory
The representation of models given in Sect. 4.4 uses HOL as a meta-language.
HOL is seen as a fragment of the foundation of mathematics, and to work with HOL rather than, e.g., a set theory, has the advantage of being simpler while not committing to a specic foundation. But it also has a drawback: FOL-models are represented as HOL-models and thus as platonic entities that live outside the logical framework LF.
It would be more appealing if FOL-models could be represented as LF entities themselves. This is indeed possible without changing the principal features of our approach: All we have to do is to rene the meta-language HOL so much that it becomes set theory. The renements can be represented elegantly as LF signature morphisms in this case from the encoding of HOL to an encoding of set theory.
More generally, we obtain the diagram below.
is a logic encoding as before. The foundation of mathematics is encoded as an LF signature F , and the model theory is dened in terms of a meta-language F 0 , which is a fragment of F . A view ϕ : F 0 → F encodes the renement of F 0 into F , or in other words, ϕ formalizes in what sense F 0 is a fragment of F .
Finally, we want to give a view µ from L mod to F , which translates the F 0 -based encoding of model theory to F . µ must have some free parameters, and this can be expressed in LF by adding these free parameters to the codomain of the view. L mod+ is the extension of F with these parameters.
Then, for any choice of these parameters, the composition µ µ translates the logical syntax into mathematics. In other words, we rene the logic encoding
So far we have used rst-order logic for L and higher-order logic for F 0 . In the following, we will give F , µ , and ϕ. F will be an encoding of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC, [Zer08, Fra22] ) encoded as an LF signature ZF C developed in Sect. 5.1. ϕ will give the standard semantics of hihger-order logic encoded as a view from HOL to ZF C developed in Sect. 5.2. Note that these steps are independent of the chosen logic L because higher-order logic is sucient for the model theory of many logics (including sorted, simply-typed, modal, description, and intuitionistic logics). We will give L mod+ and the view µ from F OL mod to ZF C in Sect. 5.3. L mod+ will arise by adding to ZF C a free parameter for the universe.
We use ZFC because it is the most widely used foundation of mathematics.
Other set theories such as Von- way. We will elaborate on that in Sect. 5.2.
The above diagram still leaves open how individual models can be represented in LF. We will look at that in Sect. 5.4 where we will form a signature Σ mod+ , which will be like Σ mod but in terms of ZF C rather than HOL, and then represent Σ-models as LF signature morphisms from Σ mod+ to ZF C. Finally we look at the encoding of model theoretical theory morphisms, at which point all aspects of FOL are encoded in LF. But since the Σ-models form a proper class and the LF expressions are countable, this raises adequacy questions, which we discuss in Sect. 5.5.
Representing Set Theory
Now we will represent ZFC set theory in LF. This is a necessary condition for the comprehensive representation of model theory in a logical framework.
But it requires a signicant investment. Isabelle. Our encoding was designed from scratch using hand-written proof terms.
There are two reasons to forgo those sophisticated encodings in favor of LF.
Firstly, LF is superior to Isabelle as a logical framework: The dependent type theory permits elegant encodings of logics, and the module system based on signature morphisms permits elegant encodings of translations. We appreciate these fundamental aspects even though Isabelle is vastly superior to LF in terms of automation and tool support. Mizar oers dependent types, but it is a standalone encoding of set theory not based on a logical framework so that it cannot encode other languages such as logics or alternative set theories.
Secondly, our encoding of set theory diers from the above two in two fundamental but non-trivial design aspects. In both cases, only the existence of dependent types makes our design choices possible. These two aspects are the choice of primitive symbols and the use of a type system, which we will detail in Sect. 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively.
The whole encoding of set theory comprises over 1000 lines of Twelf declarations. Therefore, we only showcase the most important features and refer to [KMR09] for the full encoding. In the following we will rst explain the logic we use for our set theory in Sect. 5.1.1, then use it to develop untyped set theory in Sect. 5.1.2, and then build a typed set theory on top of the untyped one in Sect. 5.1.3. Only the typed set theory will be strong enough to subsume the meta-language HOL we developed in Sect. 4.3. Finally, we dene the 2-element Notation 38. This section will require the reader to be very careful in separating levels as the LF encoding of ZFC contains three groups of connectives and quantiers.
The rst two groups are meta-level operations on propositions. They share the propositional connectives which are written normally, e.g., ∧. The rst group consists of the symbols used in the (untyped) rst-order logic underlying set theory; here equality and quantiers will be written as . = * , ∀ * , and ∃ * . The second group consists of the symbols used in the typed set theory that we will develop on top of the untyped one; here equality and quantiers will be written as . =, ∀, and ∃.
Finally the third group consists of the object level operations on Booleans.
These will be written as ∧ * , ∀ * , . = * , etc.
The notations are chosen such that the symbols ∧, ∀, . =, etc. are the intended interpretations of their counterparts in HOL, and the symbols ∧ * , ∀ * , . = * , etc. are the intended interpretations of the symbols declared in F OL mod .
Logical Language
We base ZFC on rst-order logic with equality. To reason about truth, we use an intuitionistic natural deduction calculus with introduction and elimination rules. The main LF declarations encoding this logic are the following ones.
set
: type prop : type T rue : prop → type set is the single sort of sets, prop is the type of propositions, and T rue F is the judgment for the truth of F .
We make two additions to the otherwise well-known syntax of rst-order logic: sequential connectives and a description operator. Both arise naturally when encoding set theory as we will see below.
Sequential connectives mean that, e.g., in an implication F ⇒ G, G is only considered if F is true. This is very natural in mathematical practice for example, mathematicians do not hesitate to write x = 0 ⇒ x/x = 1 when / is only dened for non-zero dividers. This can be solved by using rst-order logic with partial functions, but we hold that it is more elegant and closer to mathematics to use a sequential implication, i.e., the truth of F is assumed when considering G. Similarly, in a sequential conjunction F ∧ G, F is assumed true when considering G. We use sequential conjunction and implication; all other connectives are as usual.
Then the LF encoding contains the following declarations for propositions:
Thus ∧ and ⇒ are applied to two arguments, a formula F and another formula which is stated in a context where F is true. This is written as, e.g., F ∧ [p] G p where p is a proof of F that may be used by G. We will use F ∧ G and F ⇒ G as abbreviations when p does not occur in G; this yields the nonsequential variants of the connectives as special cases.
At this point it is not possible for G to actually make use of the truth of F because proofs cannot occur in formulas. This will change by the use of a description operator, and we will also use it when dening our typed set theory.
The proof rules for the sequential connectives are almost the same as for the usual ones. The only dierence is that the proof of the rst argument has to be supplied in a few places:
Note that these rules contain the rules for the non-sequential connectives as special cases. We omit the well-known encoding of the introduction and elimination proof rules for the remaining connectives.
The description operator is a binder that takes a formula F x with a free variable and returns the unique x satisfying F x. This is of course not wellformed for all F . Therefore, δ takes a dependent argument, which is a proof of ∃ * ! [x] F x. Here ∃ * ! abbreviates the quantier of unique existence. It can be encoded naturally using
Here dependent types permit us to require a proof of unique existence as an argument thus guaranteeing that only well-formed terms are formed. This is in contrast to the two description operators that are formalized in Isabelle/ZF or induced by the Mizar type system, respectively. Both are well-formed even for unsatisable formulas, in which case they return an arbitrary element. Thus, both Isabelle/ZF and Mizar assume not only the axiom of choice but also the existence of a global choice function, a commitment that we can avoid.
δ comes with an axiom scheme
for an arbitrary proof P , which states that δ indeed yields the element with property F . Note that proof irrelevance is derivable from ax δ , i.e., (δ F P ) returns the same object no matter which proof P is used.
Note that both sequential connectives and the description operator crucially depend on the existence of dependent types in the logical framework.
Untyped Set Theory
Regarding the primitive symbols, our encoding attempts to stay as closely to mathematical practice as possible. We only use a single primitive non-logical symbol: the binary predicate ∈: set → set → prop. This means that the only terms are the variables and those obtained from the description operator.
Thus, all mathematical symbols besides ∈ are introduced as abbreviations for sets whose (unique) existence has been proved. This permits us to follow the literature and encode all ZFC operations as existential axioms. For example, we can use
as the axiom of union. From this we can obtain a proof P X of
for an arbitrary set X. Then we can dene the union operation as
Similarly, we proceed to dene the empty set, unordered pairs, and powersets using the respective axiom, as well as encodings of the sets {x ∈ A|F (x)} and {f (x) : x ∈ A} using the axiom schemes of specication and replacement, respectively. Furthermore, we use δ and the axiom of innity to obtain a specic innite set, in our case the set of natural numbers. For all results described in this paper, we do not use δ or any of these seven axioms anywhere else, i.e., all other sets and operations on sets are dened in terms of these seven applications of δ.
Our results do not actually require the axioms of choice and excluded middle.
Similarly, regularity and innity are not used for the results presented in this section. However, these axioms may be needed to construct specic models such as models with an innite domain.
We dene ordered pairs (x, y) as {{x}, {{y}, ∅}}. Our denition is unusual and similar to Wiener's {{{x}, ∅}, {{y}}} ([Wie67] ). We do not use the common Kuratowski pairs {{x}, {x, y}} because reasoning about them often requires the principle of excluded middle to distinguish the cases x . = * y and x . = * y, which we try to avoid unless necessary. However, we immediately dene the projections π 1 and π 2 and prove the conversions π i (x 1 , x 2 ) . = * x i and isP air u ⇒ (π 1 (u), π 2 (u)) . = * u, which are known from simple type theory. Afterwards all work is carried out in terms of these derived operations and properties so that the specic denition of pairing becomes less relevant. (The LF module system can check that only the derived operations are used.)
Based on ordered pairs, we can dene relations and functions in the usual way. In particular, we dene set theoretical notions of λ abstraction and application as operations λ * A ([x : set] f x) encoding {(x, f (x)) : x ∈ A} and f @ * a encoding the b such that (a, b) ∈ f . Again we immediately prove the conversions of β-and η-equality and use only those later on.
In a similar way, we dene various other notions such as subset, singleton set, binary union, intersection, dierence, disjoint union, etc., and derive natural deduction rules for them.
Typed Set Theory
We have already remarked that a major problem with formalizations of set theory is their complexity. Type theories favor algorithmic denitions and decidable notions, and these prove indispensable when formalizing major parts of mathematics in a computer.
It is not surprising that most of the biggest successes of formalized math- In LF, again using the dependent typing, we can derive typed set theory in a rather simple way. The crucial idea is to use the dependent sum type elem A := Σ x:set (T rue x ∈ A) to represent the set A. Thus, elements x of A are represented as pairs (x, P ) where P is a proof that x is indeed in A. If we also require proof irrelevance, i.e., (x, P ) = (x, P ), then the type elem A has exactly one term for every element of A. This is inspired by the Scunak language ([Bro06]), which uses this representation as a primitive notion and provides implementation support for it.
It is a minor inconvenience that LF (unlike Scunak) supports neither dependent sum types nor the ability to make all elements of a type denitionally equal (which would permit to state the proof irrelevance). Therefore, we have to add elem and its properties as primitives to our LF encoding as shown below elem : set → type el : {x : set} T rue x ∈ A → elem A which : elem A → set why : {a : elem A} T rue (which a) ∈ A along with an axiom for proof irrelevance and one for (which (el x P )) .
el, which, and why would simply be pairing and the two projections if LF had sum types. While this increases the needed primitives, these declarations only emulate features that could easily be added to the LF language: Dependent sum types are used in, e.g., [ML74] and [Nor05] ; proof irrelevance is added in [LP09] .
Using the types elem A, we can now lift all the basic untyped operations introduced above to the typed level. In particular, we dene typed quantiers ∀, ∃, typed equality . =, and typed function spaces =⇒ in the following.
Firstly, we dene typed quantiers such as ∀ : (elem A → prop) → prop.
In higher-order logic with internal propositions ([Chu40] , compare prop : set rather than prop : type in Sect. 4.3), such typed quantication can be dened easily. In untyped set theory, this is intuitively possible using relativization,
However, an attempt to formally dene typed quantication like this meets a subtle diculty: In ∀ F , F only needs to be dened for elements of A whereas in ∀ * [x] x ∈ A ⇒ F x, F must be dened for all sets. Thus, ∀ is more general than ∀ * in that it permits a weaker argument. Of course, in
it is intended not to consider F x if x ∈ A. This is the motivation behind the introduction of sequential connectives in Sect. 5.1.1 above.
Using sequential connectives, we can dene ∀ and ∃ as follows:
Then we can derive introduction and elimination rules for ∀ and ∃, which look the same as those for the untyped ones.
Secondly, typed equality is easy to dene:
It is easy to see that all rules for . = * can be lifted to .
=.
Finally, we can dene function types that are dened in terms of untyped functions:
We omit the quite involved denitions and only mention that the typed quantiers and thus the sequential connectives are needed in the denitions.
The Booleans
The Booleans B are easy to dene as the set containing the two elements 0 = ∅ and 1 = {∅}. However, it is interesting to note that there are two dierent ways to dene this set: We can use the unordered pair {0, 1} or the powerset P(1).
Clearly, {0, 1} is a two-element set and {0, 1} ⊆ P(1), but it turns out that the two sets are only equal in the presence of the axiom of excluded middle. In fact, maybe surprisingly by using the set {x ∈ 1 | F }, it can be shown that {0, 1} . = * P(1) is equivalent to F ∨ ¬F for all formulas F .
Therefore, an intuitionistic set theory would have to dene B = {0, 1}, and it presents no fundamental obstacles to do so. But it is more convenient to use B = P(1) because then all operations on the Booleans can be obtained from the lattice operations in P(1). Therefore, we put B = P(1).
Then most of the operations on the Booleans are straightforward:
where \ returns the dierence of two sets, image f is the image of the function f , reflect F encodes the set {x ∈ 1|F }, and and return the union or intersection, respectively, of a set of sets. We omit their denitions.
In the usual way, we can prove the basic properties of the lattice operations, from which we can prove the intended properties of the Boolean operations.
Finally, we use the axiom of excluded middle once to prove that B is equal to {0, 1}.
Viewing Higher-Order Logic in Set Theory
Now that we have developed an encoding of set theory, we want to show that it subsumes the meta-language HOL used in Sect. 4 to represent model theory. Let ZF C be the LF signature containing our set theory. Then the subsumption can be expressed in LF formally as a view from HOL to ZF C.
This basic idea of the view is straightforward because all constants of HOL are mapped to ZF C-constants of the same name, i.e., we have a view %view ϕ : HOL → ZF C = { set := set elem := elem prop := prop T rue := T rue . . .
}
The view must also map all proof rules of HOL to proofs of the corresponding ZF C theorems. For the propositional connectives, those are the same rules assumed for the rst-order logic underlying ZF C. For the quantiers and equality, they are derived rules for ∀, ∃, and . =. For β-and η-equality, they are the corresponding derived rules of ZF C.
Instead of ZFC set theory, we could use any other foundation into which we can give such a view ϕ. This includes other set theories but also typed foundations such as the usual higher-order logic with internal propositions. For example, the latter arises if we use the type theory from Sect. 2.2 but with a declaration prop : tp; in that case the view would map prop to tm prop.
Viewing Model Theory in Set Theory
Next we should dene a view µ from F OL mod to ZF C. However, it is not possible to x the value of µ (univ ) because it may be dierent in every model. Thus, µ must be parametric in the choice of µ (univ ) and consequently also in that of µ (nonemp 
Notation 39. The notation M was already used in Sect. 4 for the encoding of M in HOL. We will reuse it in Sect. 5 for the encoding of a model M in LF.
This encoding captures and formalizes two of the most central intuitions about the syntax and semantics of formal languages. Firstly, the semantics of a formal language is a structure-preserving translation of the syntax into some semantic realm. For logics the semantic realm is usually mathematics, in our case encoded by a foundation F . The interpretation function is given by µ Σ µ Σ M . Secondly, the syntax consists of two parts: logical and non-logical symbols. In our case, the semantics of the logical symbols is given by a xed morphism µ µ , and the semantics of the non-logical symbols is given by the morphism M . M must map all symbols of Σ mod+ , which can be split into three groups.
Firstly, symbols included from F have a xed meaning in the foundation; the commutativity ensures that M is the identity on them. Secondly, symbols included from L mod+ encode xed parts of the models that do not depend on the signature; in the case of FOL, this is the universe encoded using the symbols U and P . Thirdly, the symbols inherited from Σ syn when constructing the pushout are the non-logical symbols.
We can formalize the above intuitions as follows:
Denition 40 (Encoding Models). An LF-based model of a FOL-signature or theory Σ is a morphism I : Σ mod+ → ZF C that is a retraction of the inclusion ZF C → Σ mod+ .
Note that this denition includes the case when Σ is a theory. In that case, LF-based models map the axioms in Σ mod+ (which stem from the pushout of Σ syn ) to proof terms in ZF C.
Denition 41 (Encoding Semantics). Assume an LF-based model I of a FOLsignature Σ and a term or formula E over Σ. Then the LF-based semantics of E is given by (µ Σ µ Σ I)( E ), which we also write as E I .
Due to the type preservation of LF signature morphism, the LF-based semantics t I of a term t is indeed an (encoding of an) element of the universe and the LF-based semantics F I of a formula is an (encoding of a) truth value.
We have a very strict notion of identity between LF-based models inherited from LF signature morphisms: Two signature morphisms are equal if they agree for all arguments up to βη-equality. For the representation of models, we need a more relaxed notion based on whether equality can be proved in ZFC:
Denition 42 (Equality of Models). Two LF-based model I 1 and I 2 of a FOLsignature or theory Σ are provably equal if T rue I 1 (U ) . = * I 2 (U ) and all types T rue I 1 (s) . = I 2 (s) for all function or predicate symbols s of Σ are inhabited.
Note that if Σ is a theory, we do not require the equality of I 1 (a) and I 2 (a) for axioms a, i.e., the proofs of the axioms are irrelevant (as long as they exist). Similarly, we do not require any equality of I 1 (P ) and I 2 (P ).
Model Reduction. As 
Adequacy
The encoding of models as signature morphisms raises a dicult question based on a simple cardinality argument: There is a proper class of FOL-models of Σ, but only countably many signature morphisms to encode them. Therefore, we have to look carefully at the adequacy of our encoding.
First of all we have:
Lemma 45. Our encoding of set theory is adequate in the following sense:
• Every closed term t : set induces a set t .
• Two closed terms s, t induce the same set if the type T rue s . = * t is inhabited.
• For every closed term t : elem A, the set which t is an element of A . Proof. All claims rely on the assumption that every proof rule of the underlying rst-order logic and every axiom in ZF C is sound with respect to the platonic universe of set theory. For researchers objecting to parts of the encoding (e.g., to excluded middle), the corresponding result holds after modifying ZF C.
For the rst claim, we expand all denitions in t. This yields either a term of the form which (el t P ), which is provably equal to the smaller term t so that we can recurse, or a term of the form δ F Q. Thus, for every term t : set, we can obtain a provable formula 
The claim is that σ is a model theoretical theory morphism i such a ϑ exists. The right-to-left direction is easy: ϑ contains proof terms that show that the reduct of a (Σ , Θ )-model satises all the axioms of Θ.
To show the converse direction, recall that we only consider nite theories, and observe that given Σ, Θ, Σ , Θ , and σ, we can write the following formula in the rst-order language of ZFC.
Here m is the number of function and predicate symbols declared in Σ; Σ declares function and predicate symbols named s 1 , . . . , s n ; M (x, y 1 , . . . , y m ) expresses that (x, y 1 , . . . , y m ) is a Σ-model with universe x; A i (x, y 1 , . . . , y m ) expresses that said Σ-model satises the i-th axiom in Θ; M (x, y 1 , . . . , y n ) and A i (x, y 1 , . . . , y n ) are dened accordingly for Σ and Θ ; and σ i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s n } is the result of applying σ to s i .
Then f is a theorem over ZFC i σ is a model-theoretical theory morphism. So assume a proof of f , from which we obtain a corresponding LF proof term p over the signature ZF C.
Moreover, over the signature Σ mod+ , which extends ZF C, we have a proof term q proving M (U, s 1 , . . . , s n )∧ i A i (U, s 1 , . . . , s n ). From p and q, we obtain a Σ mod+ -proof term r i proving A i (U, σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) for the i-th axiom in Θ. By putting ϑ(a i ) = r i , we obtain the needed LF signature morphism.
The above proof rests on the philosophical assumption that a statement about ZFC in this case, the statement σ : (Σ, Θ)
true if there is a proof of it in the rst-order language of ZFC. Moreover, we assume that this rst-order language is indeed the one that we encoded in ZF C.
Researchers working with a dierent variant of set theory can apply Thm. 50 accordingly after modifying ZF C.
Finally, observe that the proof depends on the ability to switch between the internal representation of models the tuples (U, s 1 , . . . , s n ), which can be encoded as LF terms over ZF C and the external representation of models as LF signature morphisms into ZF C.
Related Work
There Although the settings of these results are very dierent from each other's and from ours, all approaches are quite similar in that they dene syntax and models and give an interpretation function satisfying a soundness property. A novelty of our approach is to base the models on an explicitly formalized foundation:
We formalize set theory and use sets as the universes of the models. In the cited formalizations, on the other hand, the universes are types of the framework's type theory, which thus acts as an implicit foundation. Our approach makes the foundation exible and avoids such an implicit commitment. For example, we could represent the cited formalizations in LF using an LF signature for Coq, Isabelle/HOL, or ALF, respectively, instead of the one for set theory.
Another dierence is that the cited approaches all represent the interpretation function as a function of the framework's type theory. As this is impossible in LF, we use LF signature morphisms, which are less exible but provide an elegant characterization of sound interpretation functions.
Dually, there are other formalizations of the semantics of formal languages in Twelf. In [App01] , a formalization of HOL in Twelf is used to dene the semantics of a machine language for proof-carrying code. This work does not focus on the separation of syntax, models, and interpretation. Instead, all notions are introduced as denitional extensions of HOL. From our perspective, they use HOL as the foundation and dene the models by extending HOL whereas syntax and interpretation function are left implicit. In [LCH07] , an SML-equivalent language is given, and state-transition systems are used to formalize the evaluation of expressions. These corresponds to our models, but they are not strictly separated from the syntax as in our case. Like our views, the interpretation function and soundness proof live on the meta-level: They are given by a number of logic programs formalized in the Twelf meta-theory. Despite their formidable sizes, both these Twelf developments are monolithic because they predate the module system.
Regarding our specic encodings, the encodings of rst-order syntax and proof theory are straightforward and well-known (see, e.g., [HHP93] Bro06] ) is a recent system developed specically to exploit dependent type theory when encoding set theory. We discussed the dierences between these and our encoding in Sect. 5.1.
Other ways to encode set theory in dependently-typed frameworks use the framework's type theory as the foundation of mathematics, as in [Acz78] . Such encodings can be mechanized in systems like Agda and Coq, see e.g., [Gri09] .
The main advantage of these other systems over LF/Twelf is that they provide a stronger notion of denitional equality and (semi-)automated proof support. For example, Isabelle, Agda, and Coq permit the declaration of recursive functions that are evaluated automatically by the framework. Scunak implements the proof irrelevance we axiomatize in Sect. 5.1.3. All of them are connected to automated or semi-automated proof tools or provide tactic languages.
LF, on the other hand, is ontologically much simpler, even minimalistic. Con-sequently, proof terms are fully explicit and more complicated to construct by hand. But LF (as well as Scunak) can benet from the use of higher-order abstract syntax, which simplies the reasoning about adequacy relative to traditional mathematics.
Finally, the idea of encoding models as morphisms goes back to Lawvere's work on functorial models ( [Law63] ) and the work on initial algebra semantics, e.g., in [GTW78] . While these have been developed in logical frameworks on paper before, e.g., in [MTP97] and [GMdP + 07], our work marks the rst time that they can be formalized and machine-checked in a logical framework.
Conclusion
We have given a comprehensive representation of rst-order logic in a logical framework. Contrary to previous work, our representation covers both the proof and the model theoretical semantics given as provability and satisfaction, respectively. For example, the framework of institutions has been applied to the model theoretical semantics ([GB92]), and the framework LF to the proof theoretical semantics ( [HHP93] ), but a comprehensive representation has so far been lacking. This was due to the large ontological and philosophical dierences between these two views on logic.
These dierences are so big that we needed three major preliminary eorts to make this representation possible. In [Rab08, Rab10] , we conceived the logical framework combining model and proof theory that we have built upon here. In
[RS09], we gave the LF and Twelf module system that we used to implement the representation. In fact, our work is the largest case study in the Twelf module system to date. And nally, we needed a representation of a foundation of mathematics, which we have described in Sect. 5.1. These combine to a strong and exible framework whose potential is exemplied by the representation of FOL we have given.
Our work will leverage future representations in two ways. Firstly, framework design and implementation are in place now, and this paper provides a detailed template how to represent logics. In fact, we have started this already ([KMR09]), and we expect further successes fast. Secondly, the Twelf module system permits the reuse of existing representation fragments. Our representation has separated all language features into independent and reusable components so that further logics can be represented by only adding individual language features such as sorted quantication or simple function types. Moreover, the meta-language for the model theory and its interpretation in ZFC set theory are composed modularly as well. Therefore, they cannot only be reused for many other logics but can also be rened exibly if a more expressive metalanguage or a dierent foundation of mathematics are needed. For example, we could easily extend the meta-language from HOL to a dependently-typed DHOL for a particular logic representation.
An important application of logical frameworks is to use the logic representations to reason about the represented logic. To that eect, we gave adequacy results for syntax, proof theory, and model theory, and for the respective translations along morphisms. We gave a criterion to prove the soundness of a logic within the framework, and we used this to give a fully machine-veried soundness proof of rst-order logic. A similar treatment of completeness remains future work.
Finally our work is part of a larger eort to obtain an atlas of logics and translations between them. Our work explains and exemplies how logics, foundation, and models should be represented. A similar case study for logic translations is given recently in [Soj10] . 
